[creekster]

I am surprised at you guys. You are missing it (except for Arch). During the cold war, it was official American policy to refuse to state whether the USA would commit a "first strike" if threatened. IOW, we reserved the right to unleash hell in the form of our ICBMs against the Soviets in the event of any threat, even if just conventional, and even if the Soviets were not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. Many organizations and countries deemed this an unacceptable and immoral policy yet we refused to change (to my knowledge, we have yet to change this policy, although it has much less import in our current world).

A first strike, using the terms of the day, did not mean the first to use a nuclear weapon (but thanks for playing Mike) nor does it mean responding to tactical advances in a theater conflict or responding to another nation's first strike (you can also sit down, SU). Instead, it means we reserved the right to strike massively, preemptively and first. To launch our missiles out of the blue and seek to annihilate the soviets and their client states (another term from the cold war you don't hear much anymore) before they could even launch their missiles. (recall also that because the soviet missile fleet was largely liquid fueled and ours was solid fueled, their ramp up for a first strike would be much easier to detect, and their ability to effectively second strike was much lower, meaning our refusal to agree to forgo a first strike was very threatening to them). Additionally, a first strike was NOT the only part of MAD. MAD just assumes mutual destruction but, to be effective, relies on the capacity to second strike (can you launch after you are attacked?)

The point isn't to discuss the details of the cold war, but to make the point that ambiguity in stating tactics can have value. Sometimes it can have great value and even result in great benefits. That's why even though McCain's stand resonates with me, I understand why the others don't want to take it.